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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON POSTARREST,
PREHEARING DETENTION
Section 1 (section 1983) of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (the Act)1 creates
an action for damages and injunctive relief against individuals and govern-
ment agencies who deprive persons of rights or immunities secured by
the Constitution of the United States.2 For a plaintiff to maintain a section
1983 action against an individual or government body,' the plaintiff must
assert that an individual or agency, acting under the color of state law,4
I Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 5 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). Section 1983 provides that any person acting under
the color of state law who deprives a citizen of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution is liable to an injured party for an action in law and equity. See 42
U.S.C 5 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). In 1874, Congress modified the Civil Rights Act of
1871 (the Act) to allow civil damage actions against those, who -under the color of state
law, have deprived others of rights secured by the laws of the United States. See Whitman,
Constitutional Torts, 79 MicH. L. REv. 5, 5 n.2 (1980); see also Main v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S.
1, 4 (1980) ("and laws" language of § 1983 emcompasses claims based purely on statutory
violations of federal law).
2 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Since state courts frequently were reluc-
tant to enforce state law due to prejudice, passion, neglect, or intolerance, Congress passed
the Act to afford aggrieved parties a federal remedy against deprivations of their constitu-
tional rights in federal court. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 17185 (1961) (in-depth analysis
of congressional debates on Civil Rights Act), overruled in part, Monell v. Department of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972) (S 1983 inter-
poses federal courts between states and people as guardian of people's federal rights); see
also 28 U.S.C. 5 1348(3) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (§ 1983's jurisdictional counterpart). See generally
S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LInERTms LITIGATION, §§ 1.01-121 (1st ed. 1979) (ex-
planation of § 1983 causes of action); Whitman, supra note 1, at 5 (discussion of § 1983);
Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1133 (1977) (survey
of § 1983 actions).
See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S 658, 690-91 (1978) (cities, coun-
ties, and local government entities are suitable defendants in § 1983 actions); NAHMOD, supra
note 2, § 1.08 (natural persons, corporate entities, and associations are "persons" within
the meaning of 5 1983). But see id. (eleventh amendment operates to bar S 1983 actions
against states and state agencies); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XI (citizens may not bring -
civil actions against any state of the United States). See generally NAHMOD, supra note 2,
§ 7.02 (legislators are immune from liability for damages if acting in traditional legislative
area); id. at § 7.06 (judges have absolute immunity for damages under S 1983); id. at 5 7.10
(prosecutors are immune from liability for damages if acting within scope of duties in in-
itiating and pursuing criminal prosecution under § 1983).
' See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152, 163 (1970) (color of law and state
action are same within meaning of § 1983). When a state employee acting on behalf of state
and pursuant to state authority deprives a citizen of a constitutional right, the action is
state action within the meaning of section 1983. See NAHMOD, supra note 2, § 2.04 (damages
or injunctive relief are available to plaintiff if state employee deprives plaintiff of constitu-
tional rights under claimed authority of state law). Constitutional deprivations of a citizen
resulting from abuse of an official position by a state employee constitute an action taken
under the color of law within section 1983. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 170, 186-87
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violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights.5 The identification of constitu-
tionally impermissible conduct, therefore, is crucial in determining whether
an aggrieved party is able to state a cause of action under section 1983.
In Gerstein v. Pugh,7 the Supreme Court held that the fourth
amendment8 requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prere-
quisite to extended postarrest detention of an arrestee.9 The Court,
(1961) (illegal search and seizure by Chicago police constituted action under color of state
law), overruled in part, Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
5 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). To establish a prima facie section 1983
cause of action, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant's conduct was a cause in fact
of the plaintiffs constitutional deprivation. See NAHMOD, supra note 2, SS 2.01, 3.15 (language
of S 1983 requires causal relationship between defendant's conduct and plaintiffs constitu-
tional deprivation). Since Congress enacted the Act pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment, only deprivations of citizens' fourteenth amendment rights are vindicable under
section 1983. See NAHMOD, supra note 2, S 2.01. Deprivations of constitutional rights that
will support S 1983 cause of action include violations of fourteenth amendment rights stan-
ding alone, violations of Bill of Rights that due process clause has incorporated into four-
teenth amendment, and violations of due process that Constitution does not explicitly
enumerate. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV S 5 (fourteenth amendment grants Con-
gress wide powers to enforce its provisions).
I See NAHMOD, supra note 2, § 2.01 (plaintiff must prove that defendant's conduct was
cause in fact of plaintiffs fourteenth amendment deprivation, see also Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976) (delibrate indifference shown by prison officials towards prisoner's
medical needs will support S 1983 cause of action for violation of prisoner's eighth amend-
ment rights against cruel and unusual punishment); Navarette v. Enomoto, 536 F.2d 277,
279 (9th Cir. 1976) (prison authorities' intentional interference with first amendment right
of inmate to send mail supports S 1983 cause of action), rev'd on other grounds sub noam,
Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978); Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228, 1232 (4th
Cir. 1970) (plaintiff who sustains injuries arbitrarily inflicted by police officer has S 1983
claim against officer for deprivation of fourth amendment rights); Hardwick v. Hurley, 289
F.2d 529, 529-31 (7th Cir. 1961) (plaintiff has stated § 1983 cause of action when complaint
avers that officer beat plaintiff in attempt to force plaintiff to incriminate himself in viola-
tion of his fifth amendment rights). See generally Developments in the Law--Section 1983
and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1133 (1977) (survey of S 1983 actions).
1 420 U.S. 103 (1975). In Gerstein v. Pugh, the issue before the Supreme Court was
whether the Constitution entitles a person arrested and held for trial under a prosecutor's
information to a judicial determination of probable cause for pretrial restraint of liberty.
" Id. at 105; see infra text accompanying notes 15 & 16 (discussion of facts in Gerstein); notes
17-19 (discussion of district court and circuit court holdings in Gerstein); notes 9, 20-25 (discus-
sion of Supreme Court analysis in Gerstein).
8 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment to the Constitution provides that
"the right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable ... seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause . . ." Id.
' See 420 U.S. at 114. In Gerstein, the Supreme Court balanced the government's in-
terest in detecting and preventing crime against an individual's interest in his freedom
of movement and determined that the interests of an individual once in custody are superior
to the government's interests. See id. (arrestee's need for neutral determination of prob-
able cause increases while need for untampered police activity decreases). The Gerstein
Court explained that prolonged pretrial confinement frequently has unfortunate consequences
for an arrestee. See id. (pretrial confinement may jeopardize suspect's job, familial relation-
ships and economic well-being); see also L. KATZ, JUSTICE Is THE CRIME 56 (1972) (prolonged
[Vol. 40:1555
POSTARREST, PREHEARING DETENTION
however, explained that postarrest probable cause hearings need not be
adversarial." The Gerstein Court further held that violations of an
arrestee's fourth amendment right to probable cause hearings will not
subject the arrestee's criminal conviction to appellate reversal.1 The failure
of a law enforcement officer promptly to present an arrestee before a
magistrate to determine whether probable cause exists to detain an ar-
restee, however, may support an action under section 1983.M2
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed directly whether the
Constitution limits the permissible duration of postarrest detention prior
to the required probable cause hearing,'" the Gerstein Court necessarily
detention of arrestee prior to trial is disastrous). Since the consequences of pretrial con-
finement are quite severe, the Gerstein Court held that the fourth amendment requires
a neutral and detached determination of probable cause prior to extended postarrest deten-
tion. See id. (result has common-law support). See generally Comment, Pretrial Restraint
Hearing: Constitutional Right of Constitutional Wrong, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 214 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Pretrial Restraint Hearing] (Gerstein case comment).
" See infra note 21 (discussion of Gerstein holding that probable cause determination
need not be adversarial).
" See 420 U.S. at 119. In Gerstein, the Supreme Court explained that appellate courts
should not vacate a conviction if law enforcement officers detained a defendant pending
trial without a determination of probable cause for the confinement. Id.; see Frisbie v. Col-
lins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952) (abduction of defendant by state officers for purpose of secur-
ing him for trial will not invalidate his conviction under fourteenth amendment due process).
12 See infra text accompanying notes 102-08 (language in Gerstein is basis for fourth
amendment prohibition against postarrest, prehearing detention of unreasonable duration).
If a plaintiff can assert a deprivation of a due process right by an individual acting under
the authority of state law, he will be able to state a section 1983 cause of action. See 42
U.S.C. S 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); see also supra note 5 language of S 1983 requires
causal relationship between plaintiff's injury and defendant's conduct).
The fourth amendment prohibits the arrest of an individual upon less than probable
cause. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216 (1979) (seizure and transportation of
individual for interrogation without probable cause was indistinguishable from arrest and
therefore illegal). An arrest lacking an appropriate warrant or without probable cause general-
ly constitutes a violation of due process vindicable under S 1983. Lucero v. Donovan, 354
F.2d 16, 19-21 (9th Cir. 1965) (alleged unlawful arrest will support S 1983 cause of action
if arresting officer acted under color of state law and if arrest subjected arrestee to depriva-
tion of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by Constitution); see Anderson v. Haas,
341 F.2d 497, 499 (3d Cir. 1965) (federal law determines constitutional validity of arrest
in § 1983 actions); Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110, 115, 121 (5th Cir. 1963) (arrest for legal
conduct deemed offensive is illegal and vindicable under S 1983).
" See Fisher v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Auth., 690 F.2d 1133, 1139 (4th
Cir. 1982); see also Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 118 n.6 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(question of whether Constitution limits length-of time police may detain suspect without
arraignment is open question); Owen, A Hard Look at the Military Magistrate Pretrial Com-
mencement Hearing: Gerstein and Courtney Revisited, 88 MIL. L. R. 3, 26 (1980) (Supreme
Court has not stated specific constitutional limitation on length of time police may detain
suspect without presentation before judicial officer).
" See 420 U.S. at 113-14. In Gerstein, the Supreme Court explained that a policeman's
on-the-scene determination of probable cause permits a brief period of detention to take
administrative steps incident to arrest. See id. The court further explained that the fourth
amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause prior to extended pretrial
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touched upon the issue when analyzing the relationship between a judicial
probable cause hearing and a police officer's ad hoc probable cause
determination.14 In Gerstein, a Florida prosecutor filed an information pur-
suant to Florida arrest procedure charging Pugh with robbery and carry-
ing a concealed weapon." Pugh brought a section 1983 class action against
Dade County officials alleging that Florida arrest procedure violated his
constitutional rights because the procedure did not afford Pugh a judicial
determination of probable cause for his arrest and postarrest detention."8
The District Court for the Southern District of Florida ordered the defen-
dants to provide Pugh an immediate probable cause hearing prior to fur-
ther detention." The district court also ordered county officials to submit
a plan providing probable cause hearings in all cases instituted by a pros-
ecutor's information. 8 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court holding on appeal.' 9
confinement. See id. at 114; see also supra text accompanying notes 9, 20-25 (discussion of
Supreme Court's analysis in Gerstein). The Court's analysis implies a fourth amendment
limitation on permissible duration of postarrest, prehearing detention. See Fisher v.
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Auth., 690 F.2d 1133, 1140-41 (4th Cir. 1982) (viola-
tions of arrestees' right against postarrest, prehearing detention of unreasonable duration
are determined on case-by-case basis); Sanders v. City of Houston, 543 F. Supp. 694, 699-702
(S.D. Tex. 1982) (Gerstein language provides basis for fourth amendment prohibition against
postarrest, prehearing detention of unreasonable duration). Lively v. Cullinane, 451 F. Supp.
1000, 1004 (D.D.C. 1978) (police can delay probable cause hearing only for time necessary
to process arrestee); see also Owen, supra note 13, at 24 (prompt presentation of arrestee
is fundamental right guaranteed by fourth amendment).
The fourth amendment prohibits the arrest of an individual on less than probable cause.
See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 592, 602 (1975) (arrest made for investigatory purposes
on less than probable cause is unconstitutional). The probable cause standard for an arrest
is the facts and circumstances sufficient to persuade a reasonable man that a suspect has
committed or is committing a crime. See Beck v. Ohio, 370 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). In Gerstein,
the Supreme Court explained that the probable cause analysis for arrest and postarrest
detention are identical. See 420 U.S. at 120. See generally, 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURES S 3.1 (1st ed. i978) (historical development of fourth amendment probable cause
requirement).
15 See 420 U.S. at 105 n.1; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. S 904.01 (West 1975) (authorized
initiation of noncapital prosecutions by direct information without prior preliminary hearing).
" See Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp. 1107, (S.D. Fla. 1971). In State ex rel Hardy
v. Blount, the Florida Supreme Court held that the filing of an information by a prosecutor
foreclosed the suspect's right to a preliminary hearing. See 261 So.2d 172, 173-74 (Fla. 1972).
Since Florida procedure provided no review by a judicial officer as to the probable cause
for arrest and detention, the police, therefore, could have detained a person charged by
information for a substantial period solely on the decision of a prosecutor. See 332 F. Supp.
at 1109.
17 See 332 F. Supp. at 1114-15. In Pugh, the district court held that the fourth and
fourteenth amendments require a jurdicial determination of probable cause in direct infor-
mation cases. See id.
" See id. at 1116.
" See Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778, 778-89 (5th Cir. 1973) (circuit court modified
district court decision in minor particulars and suggested that hearing provided by amended
Florida rules was acceptable if provided to all defendants in custody pending trial); see also
Pretrial Restraint Hearing, supra note 9, at 214 nn.6 & 7 (discussion of Pugh appellate history).
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Although the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's holding that
the fourth amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause
prior to extended postarrest detention,H the Court refused to extend adver-
sary safeguards to the probable cause determination. 21 The Gerstein Court
explained that a probable cause hearing by a detached and neutral
magistrate must follow a police officer's on-the-scene assessment of pro-
bable cause for arrest since a police officer's commitment to zealous law
enforcement frequently is inconsistent with constitutional safeguards.'
In Pugh, the district court handed down two more decisions before the circuit court con-
sidered an appeal. See 533 F. Supp. 1286, 1289 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (ordered new Florida rules
of criminal procedure amended to require preliminary hearing for arrestees, 336 F. Supp.
490, 491 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (adopted local plan that included imposition of adversary safeguards
on preliminary hearing).
I See 420 U.S. at 114; see also supra note 9 (Supreme Court analysis in Gerstein).
21 See 420 U.S. at 120. In Gerstein, the Court determined that adversary safeguards
are not essential for the probable cause determination required by the fourth amendment.
See id. at 119-20 (adversary safeguards include counsel, confrontations, cross examination,
and compulsory process for witnesses). The Gerstein Court explained that the lesser conse-
quences of a probable cause determination justify the use of an informal procedure. See
id. The Court explained that a reasonable doubt standard for postarrest detention does
not require difficult resolutions of conflicting evidence that a higher standard of proof re-
quires. See id. at 121. The Gerstein Court, therefore, held that an ex parte determination
of probable cause is reliable, and that adversary safeguards at probable cause determina-
tions are not mandatory. See id. at 120. But see 420 U.S. at 127 (Stewart, J., concurring)
(traditional requirements of due process are applicable in context of pretrial detention);
Berdon, Liberty and Property Under the Procedural Due Process Clause: The Requirement
of an Adversary Hearing to Determine Probable Cause, 53 CONN. B. J. 31, 44 (1979) (any
deprivation of liberty triggers procedural safeguards for adversary bearing); Comment,
Criminal Procedure-Filing by Information: Determination of Probable Cause Before Extended
Restraint of Liberty, Gerstein v. Pugh, 51 WASH. L. Rzv. 425, 426-27 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Filing By Information] (Gerstein Court ignored fact that fourteenth amendment provides
independent safeguards for individuals detained during pretrial stage of criminal prosecution).
In Gerstein, the Court also held that the probable cause determination was not a critical
stage during prosecution that required appointment of counsel. See 420 U.S. at 122; see
also Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970) (Alabama preliminary hearing used to deter-
mine whether evidence justifies going to trial under information, or presenting case to grand
jury is critical stage in prosecution that requires appointment of counsel); United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-38 (1967) (presence of counsel at identification line-up promotes
fairness at confrontation and full hearing at trial and, therefore, is critical stage requiring
appointment of counsel). Since the failure to appoint counsel for probable cause hearing
will not prejudice defendant's right to a fair hearing at trial, no sixth amendment right
to counsel attaches. See 420 U.S. at 122-23. See generally Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
69 (1932) (person accused of crime requires counsel at every step in proceedings against
him); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (accused shall have assistance of counsel for his defense in
all criminal prosecutions).
' See 420 U.S. at 112-13.. In Gerstein, the Supreme Court explained that factual in-
ferences drawn by a detached and neutral magistrate frequently differ from factual inferences
drawn by an officer engaged in the enterprise of ferreting out crime. Id. (citing Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)); see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
449-53 (1971) (prosecuting attorney may not determine whether probable cause for arrest
and detention exists since prosecutor's responsibility to law enforcement is inconsistent
with constitutional role of neutral and detached magistrate); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
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The Court stated that a police officer's ad hoc determination of probable
cause provides legal justification for arresting a criminal suspect and de-
taining the suspect a brief period to take administrative steps incident
to arrest." The Gerstein Court also explained that judicial officers must
make probable cause determinations either before or promptly after
arrest. 4 The Court's discussion of the relationship between a police of-
ficer's ad hoc probable cause determination and a judicial probable cause
hearing is the foundation on which federal courts have recognized that
the Constitution limits the duration of postarrest detention prior to a
judicial probable cause determination."
Federal courts have had few opportunities to consider whether the
Constitution places limitations on the duration of postarrest, prehearing
detention. 6 Prehearing police detention is immune from appellate scrutiny
108, 111 (1964) (neutral and detached magistrate may not serve as rubber stamp for police).
The Gerstein Court held that postarrest judicial review of probable cause for arrest and
detention maximizes individual liberty without imposing undue restraints on law enforce-
ment officers. See 420 U.S. at 113.
' See 420 U.S. at 113-14; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 30-31 (1969) (fourth amend-
ment permits limited frisk of individual when suspicious behavior of individual justifies
officer in believing that individual is armed and presently dangerous).
2' 420 U.S. at 125. In Gerstein, the Court recognized the right of the states to develop
their own probable cause procedures within their individual systems of criminal procedure.
See id. at 123. The Gerstein Court explained that probable cause procedures adopted by
the states are immune from judicial scrutiny if the procedures meet the threshold require-
ment of the fourth amendment. See id. at 123-25 (magistrate must make judicial determina-
tion of probable cause promptly after arrest and prior to significant pretrial restraint of
liberty). The states have adopted probable cause procedures consistent with the requirements
mandated by Gerstein. See CAL. PENAL CODE S 849 (West 1970) (providing for bringing ar-
restee before magistrate "without unnecessary delay"); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-601 (1977)
(providing for bringing arrestee before magistrate "forthwith"); GA. CODE ANN. S 27-212
(1978) (requiring presentation of arrestee before magistrate within 24 hours). See generally
Owen, supra note 13, at 26-28 n.58 (list of state presentation statutes).
" See Fisher v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Auth., 690 F.2d 1133, 1140-41
(4th Cir. 1982) (citing Gerstein) (violations of arrestees' right against postarrest, prehearing
detention of unreasonable duration are determined on case-by-case basis); Sanders v. City
of Houston, 543 F. Supp. 694, 699-702 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (Gerstein language provides basis
for fourth amendment prohibition against postarrest, prehearing detention of unreasonable
duration); Lively v. Cullinane, 451 F. Supp. 1000, 1004 (D.D.C. 1978) (delay of probable cause
hearing beyond time necessary to process arrestee violates fourth amendment); see also
Owen, supra note 13, at 24 (prompt presentation of arrestee to determine probable cause
for detention is fundamental right guaranteed by fourth amendment).
' See 690 F.2d at 1139 n.7. In Fisher, the court explained that opportunities to con-
sider whether the Constitution forbids postarrest, prehearing detention of unreasonable
duration structurally had been limited until the revitalization of S 1983. See id.; see NAHMOD,
supra note 2, 5 2.02 (S 1983 remained in dormant state from time of enactment until Supreme
Court's holding in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), because of restrictive application
of state action doctrine, narrow reading of privileges and immunities clause, and reluctance
of courts to incorporate Bill of Rights into fourteenth amendment); see also supra note 2
(discussion of S 1983 of Civil Rights Act).
In Monroe v. Pape, the Supreme Court broadly extended the scope of section 1983. See
365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961), overruled in part, Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S.
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in direct and collateral attacks on a defendant's conviction. 7 Courts,
therefore, only address the issue of whether the Constitution imposes dura-
tional limitations on postarrest, prehearing detention in section 1983 ac-
tions that directly challenge the duration of postarrest, prehearing
custody. 8 When plaintiffs have presented the issue in section 1983 ac-
tions, federal courts have recognized that the Constitution limits the dura-
tion of postarrest, prehearing detention.' Federal courts, however, have
developed distinct analyses when determining the basis for a constitu-
tional limitation on permissible duration of postarrest, prehearing
detention.' For example, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have held that
658 (1978); see also NAHMOD, supra note 2, S 2.02 (Monroe is seminal case construing 5 1983).
In Monroe, city police officers entered plaintiff's home without warning and forced the
occupants to stand naked while the officers ransacked the house. See 365 U.S. at 169. City
policemen arrested the plaintiff and released him without filing any charges against him.
See id. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding dismissing plaintiff's 5 1983
action for violations of plaintiff's fourth amendment rights because plaintiff failed to allege
an actionable constitutional deprivation. See 272 F.2d 365, 366 (7th Cir. 1959).
The issue before the Supreme Court in Monroe was whether Congress, in enacting
1983, intended to provide a remedy to persons deprived of constitutional rights, privileges
or immunities by an official's abuse of his authority. See 365 U.S. at 172. The Monroe Court
held that exercise of police authority in a manner inconsistent with state law still constitutes
action taken under color of state law. See id. at 183; see also 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 (1976 & Supp.
V 1981) (plaintiff must allege constitutional deprivation by person acting under color of
state law to maintain S 1983 action). The Monroe court held that the plaintiff properly asserted
a S 1983 cause of action because the city police officers had violated plaintiff's fourth
amendment rights. See 365 U.S. at 187. See generally, Comment, Constitutional Law: "Under
Cover Of' Law and the Civil Rights Act, 1961 DUKE L.J. 452 (1961) (discussion of Monroe
case).
. See 690 F.2d at 1139 n.7; see also 420 U.S. at 119 (illegal arrest or detention does
not void valid conviction). In Fisher, the Fourth Circuit explained that appellate courts
cannot address whether the Constitution imposes direct limitations on permissible dura-
tion of postarrest, prehearing detention in criminal appeals unless the defendant claimed
that evidence acquired during postarrest, prehearing confinement offended the fourth amend-
ment exclusionary rule. 690 F.2d at 1139 n.7; see Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,
397-98 (1914) (fourth amendment bars use of evidence secured through illegal search and
seizure); State v. Phelps, 297 N.W.2d 769, 774 (N.D. 1980) (exclusionary rule renders inad-
missible all evidence obtained in searches and seizures violative of fourth amendment); see
also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (fourth amendment exclusionary rule is applicable
to states through fourteenth amendment due process clause).
See 690 F.2d at 1139 n.7.
See id. at 1140-41 (reasonableness requirement of fourth amendment limits duration
of postarrest, prehearing detention); Sanders v. City of Houston, 543 F. Supp. 694, 702-03
(S.D. Tex. 1982) (Constitution imposes limitations on permissible duration of ostarrest, prehear-
ing detention);, Lively v. Cullinane, 451 F. Supp. 1000, 1004 (D.D.C. 1978) (delay of probable
cause hearing beyond time necessary to process arrestee violates fourth amendment).
' See infra text accompanying notes 49-53, 59 & 60 (Fourth and Fifth Circuits have
recognized that fourth amendment imposes limitations upon permissible duration of postar-
rest, prehearing detention); notes 69, 78-80 (Third Circuit implicitly has recognized that
fourteenth amendment due process limits duration of arrestee's prehearing custody). But
see infra note 58 (one line of Fifth Circuit cases has refused to recognize that Constitution
places durational limits on postarrest, prehearing detention).
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the fourth amendment, made applicable to the states through the four-
teenth amendment,3' precludes postarrest, prehearing detention of
unreasonable duration.2 The Third Circuit, however, has suggested that
the fourteenth amendment due process clause, independent of the fourth
amendment, imposes limitations on the duration of postarrest custody prior
to a probable cause hearing.'
In Fisher v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, ' the
Fourth Circuit held that the fourth amendment directly imposes limits
on the permissible duration of postarrest, prehearing detention.' In Fisher,
a Washington, D.C. transit officer arrested Fisher for violating a local
ordinance that prohibits eating on Washington Metropolitan Area Tran-
sit Authority (WMATA) trains.' After arresting Fisher, the officer re-
quested transportation from the Arlington County Police to carry Fisher
to the Arlington County Police Station.' At the stationhouse, a duty officer
instructed the arresting officer to obtain a warrant from a magistrate
located in a nearby office." After securing the arrest warrant and serv-
ing the warrant on Fisher, the arresting officer read Fisher her Miranda
rights. The arresting officer presented her to a booking officer for fur-
ther administrative proceedings.40 The arresting officer then departed to
go about his regular duties.4 Fisher brought a section 1983 action against
WMATA and the arresting officer for alleged constitutional violations in-
"' See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25 (1949)) (prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures under fourth amendment
is applicable to states through fourteenth amendment).
' See infra text accompanying notes 34-57 (discussion of Fourth Circuit decision in
Fisher v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Auth., 690 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir. 1982); notes
59-68 (discussion of Sanders v. City of Houston, 543 F. Supp. 694 (S.D. Tex. 1982)).
1 See infra text accompanying notes 69-80 (discussion of Patzig v. ONeil, 577 F.2d
841 (3d Cir. 1978)).
690 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir. 1982).
1 See id. at 1140 (reasonableness requirement of fourth amendment operates past in-
itial seizure and limits permissible duration of postarrest, prehearing detention); see also
infra text accompanying notes 49-53 (discussion of Fisher court's analysis).
" See 690 F.2d 1135.
17 See id. at 1136.
See id.
See id. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that statements made by
a defendant at a custodial interrogation are inadmissible unless enforcement officers in-
form a defendant of his constitutional rights prior to interrogation. See 384 U.S. 436, 478-79
(1966). Prior to a custodial interrogation, the fifth amendment guarantee against self in-
crimination requires that enforcement officers advise an interrogatee of his rights to re-
main silent, to know that the prosecution will use anything he says against him, to have
counsel present, and to waive such rights only by voluntary choice. See id. at 467-73. See
generally, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term. 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 205 (1966) (Miranda does
not address what constitutes valid waiver).
" See 690 F.2d at 1136.
"' See id. at 1141.
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cident to Fisher's arrest and detention.' At trial, the district court ordered
directed verdicts for the defendants.43
On appeal, Fisher contended that the failure of the arresting officer
to bring her immediately before a committing officer pursuant to a Virginia
statute" constituted a per se violation of her constitutional rights. 5 Fisher,
therefore, argued that the deprivation of her constitutional rights was
vindicable under section 1983.46 The Fourth Circuit summarily rejected
Fisher's argument explaining that police conduct violative of a state statute
does not amount to an automatic violation of the Constitution.47 The Fisher
court further explained that Fisher's reliance on the Virginia presentment
statute for determining the constitutionality of the arresting officer's con-
duct was inappropriate since a determination of the constitutional validity
of arrest and detention prior to a probable cause hearing requires a fourth
amendment analysis.48
2 See id. at 1137; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (deprivation of in-
dividual's due process rights by persons acting under color of law is condition precedent
to S 1983 cause of action). See generally NAHMOD, supra note 2, SS 2.01, 3.02 (plaintiff must
demonstrate that defendant's conduct was cause of plaintiffs constitutional deprivation).
4 See 690 F.2d at 1137. In Fisher, the district court denied Fisher's motion for sum-
mary judgment against WMATA and the arresting officer on her unconstitutional deten-
tion claim. See id. at 1137 n.2. The district court also denied Fisher's request for directed
verdict. See id.
" See VA. CODE § 19.2-74 (1975). The applicable Virginia statute in Fisher requires an
arresting officer to take the name and address of a misdemeanant arrested for violating
a county, town, or city ordinance. Id. An arresting officer then must issue a summons noti-
fying an arrestee to appear at a specified time and place. Id. If an arresting officer believes
that an arrestee will disregard a summons issued under a Virginia statute, an arresting
officer shall take any arrestee forthwith before the nearest or most accessible judicial of-
ficer. Id. The judicial officer shall determine whether probable cause exists that an arrestee
will disregard a summons. Id. The judicial officer has descretion to issue a summons or
warrant. Id.
," See 690 F.2d at 1137. In Fisher, Fisher argued that the arresting officer failed to
take her "forthwith" before the nearest judicial officer pursuant to Virginia law. See id.
"s See id.
" See 690 F.2d at 1138 (citing Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1974)) (officer's
violation of Maryland law recognizing that probable cause does not authorize warrantless
arrest of misdemeanant may impose common-law liability for false arrest but, S 1983 does
not provide remedy for common-law tort, see also Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183, 196
(5th Cir. 1971) (unreasonable delay in presenting arrestee before magistrate may support
state action for false imprisonment but presentment delay will not support S 1983 action
since presentment delay does not violate constitutional rights), rmodified en bane, 456 F.2d
835, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972).
"s See 690 F.2d at 1138 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1974)). In Fisher,
the court held that Fisher's § 1983 claim alleging an unconstitutional postarrest deten-
tion exists in the fourth amendment because the standards and procedures for arrest and
detention have been derived from the fourth amendment. See 690 F.2d at 1138. In Gerstein,
the Court stated that the fourth amendment's balance between public and individual in-
terests defines the due process for seizures of persons including the detention of suspects
awaiting trial. See 420 U.S. at 125 n.27. But see Berdon, supra note 21, at 41 (sole concern
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Relying on dicta in Gerstein v. Pugh,41 the Fisher court found that
the fourth amendment precludes postarrest, prehearing detention of
unreasonable duration.' The Fisher court held that the reasonableness
requirement of the fourth amendment limits the permissible duration of
postarrest, piehearing incarceration." The Fisher court held that the
reasonableness standard of the fourth amendment is implicit in the Gers-
tein Court's statement that a law enforcement officer's ad hoc probable
cause determination provides a legal basis for a brief period of detention
of an arrestee to perform the administrative steps incident to arrest.2
Since the Supreme Court in Gerstein also held that the fourth amend-
ment requires a judicial determination of probable cause prior to extend-
ed postarrest restraint of liberty, the Fisher court decided that the
reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment imposes limitations
on the permissible duration of postarrest, prehearing custody.
After recognizing that the fourth amendment prohibits postarrest,
prehearing detention of unreasonable duration, the Fisher court presented
a general standard for courts to apply when determining the constitu-
tional validity of postarrest detention prior to the required probable cause
hearing. 4 Since the administrative steps incident to a particular arrest
will vary with logistical circumstances, factual exigencies, and prosecutorial
procedures, the Fisher court held that the fourth amendment
reasonableness standard for determining the constitutionality of postar-
rest, prehearing detention only is applicable on a case-by-case basis.5 The
of fourth amendment is initial seizure of person or property); Filing By Information, supra
note 21, at 426 (fourth amendment analysis is inappropriate to consideration of postarrest,
prehearing detention).
420 U.S. 103 (1975).
See 690 F.2d at 1140.
51 See id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 52 & 53 (Fisher court relied on Gers-
tein Court's analysis of relationship between judicial probable cause determination and
policeman's ad hoc assessment of probable cause to determine that reasonableness stan-
dard of fourth amendment governs duration of postarrest, prehearing detention).
See 690 F.2d at 1140.
See id. (citing Gerstein). In Fisher, the court adopted a substantial excerpt of the
Gerstein analysis that displayed respect for the compromise between state interest in law
enforcement and the individual's right to be secure in his person. See id.; see also supra
note 9 (discussion of Gerstein balancing analysis). Once a suspect is in custody, the interests
of the state subside relative to those of the arrestee. See 690 F.2d at 1140 (citing Gerstein)
(danger that suspect will escape or commit further crime no longer exists during postar-
rest detention while impact of pretrail confinement upon arrestee frequently is catastrophic).
See generally KATZ, supra note 9, at 51-62 (interference caused by arrest and postarrest
detention impinges upon arrestee's dignity, reputation, and his right to be from arbitrary
actions by state).
' See 690 F.2d at 1140; see also infra text accompanying notes 55-57 (totality of cir-
cumstances determines constitutionality of postarrest, prehearing detention).
"See 690 F.2d at 1140; see also Sanders v. City of Houston, 543 F. Supp. 694, 701
(S.D. Tex. 1982) (circumstances of each case determine constitutionality of postarrest, prehear-
ing detention, Lively v. Cullinane, 451 F. Supp. 1000, 1005 (D.D.C. 1978) (only strong show-
ing that presentation delay is administratively necessary will excuse delay); Dommer v.
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Fisher court decided that the question of whether postarrest, prehearing
detention violates the fourth amendment prohibition against detention of
unreasonable duration requires an analysis of the nature of, and reasons
for, delay in presenting an arrestee before a magistrate to determine pro-
bable cause for detention.' Applying the fourth amendment reasonableness
standard to the facts of the case in Fisher, the court concluded that Fisher's
section 1983 claim against the arresting officer failed because the arresting
officer did not detain Fisher beyond the brief period of detention necessary
to take the administrative steps incident to arrest. 7
The Fisher court's holding that the fourth amendment imposes limita-
tions on permissible duration of postarrest, prehearing detention is con-
Hatcher, 427 F. Supp. 1040, 1045 (N.D. Ind. 1977) (holding arrestees for investigation more
than 24 hours before probable cause determination deprives arrestees of rights guaranteed
by fourth amendment), modified, 653 F.2d 289 (1981). See generally infra text accompanying
notes 59-68 (discussion of Sanders).
See 690 F.2d at 1140-41. In Sanders v. City of Houston, the District Court for the
Southern District of Texas explained that federal decisions construing rule 5(a) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure are helpful in determining whether police delay and procedures
incident to arrest are reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment. See 543
F. Supp. 694, 699-701 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (similarity between unreasonable delay language of
rule 5(a) and prompt presentation requirement prior to extended pretrial confinement in
Gerstein permits instructive analogy). Under rule 5(a), federal officers must bring arrestees
before a federal magistrate without unnecessary delay. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a); see also
Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214, 218 (1965) (Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure re-
quire determination of probable cause at first appearance). Since evidence obtained during
periods of prolonged detention in violation of rule 5(a) is inadmissible in federal court, federal
courts have had ample opportunity to comment upon what constitutes unnecessary delay
under rule 5(a). See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341-43 (1943) (Supreme Court
invokes supervisory powers to exclude evidence obtained during prolonged period of postar-
rest, prehearing detention to adequately enforce congressional requirement of prompt
presentment before magistrate); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 453 (1957) (reaffir-
ming McNabb); see also United States v. Brown, 459 F.2d 319, 325 (5th Cir. 1971) (question-
ing of suspect prior to presentation before magistrate is not unnecessary delay under rule
5(a)), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 864 (1972); United States v. Mayes, 417 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir.
1969) (per curiam) (unnecessary delay exists when magistrate is available and no justifica-
tion for detention exists); Granza v. United States, 377 F.2d 746, 749 (5th Cir. (taking writing
samples does not constitute unnecessary delay under rule 5(a)), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 939
(1967); United States v. D'Argento, 373 F.2d 307, 313 (7th Cir. 1967) (fingerprinting and
photographing does not constitute unnecessary delay under rule 5(a)). See generally Hogan
& Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47 GEo. L.J. 1 (1958)
(appraisal of MeNabb-Mallory rule soon after Supreme Court's decision in Mallory v. United
States); Note, The Ill-Advised State Court Revival of the McNabb-Mallory Rule, 72 J. CRIM.
L. &. CRMIINOLOGY 204 (1981). (criticizing state revival of McNabb-Mallory rule as excluding
voluntary confessions).
", See 690 F.2d at 1141. In Fisher, the Fourth Circuit held that the evidence showed
that the arresting officer acted as expeditiously as the circumstances reasonably permit-
ted. See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 36-43 (discussion of facts in Fisher).
The Fisher court held that the arresting officer promptly arranged for arrestee's transpor-
tation to the Arlington County Police Station. See 690 F.2d at 1141. The arresting officer
further procured an arrest warrant and served the warrant on arrestee in a fashion within
his authorized duties. See id.
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sistent with Fifth Circuit cases that have addressed the issue since
Gerstein.-8 For example, in Sanders v. City of Houston,l the District Court
for the Southern District of Texas held that language employed by the
Gerstein Court provides that basis for a fourth amendment prohibition
against postarrest, prehearing detention of unreasonable duration.' In
Sanders, the plaintiff brought a section 1983 class action against the City
I See McGill v. Parsons, 532 F.2d 484, 486 (5th Cir. 1976) (fourth amendment requires
that probable cause hearing occur within reasonable time); Sanders v. City of Houston,
543 F. Supp. 694, 699-702 (Gerstein language provides basis for fourth amendment prohibi-
tion against postarrest, prehearing detention of unreasonable duration). In McGill, the Fifth
Circuit reinstated a trial court order that set definite guidelines on how long the police
could detain an arrestee arrested without a warrant before according him a probable cause
hearing before a state magistrate. See 532 F.2d at 485, 486 n.2 (probable cause hearing must
occur within reasonable time not to exceed 24 hours). In McGill, the plaintiff brought a
S 1983 class action alleging that the duration of his postarrest detention prior to a probable
cause determination violated his constitutional rights. See id. at 485-87 (plaintiff alleged
violations of fifth, sixth, seventh and fourteenth amendment rights). Although the McGill
court was reluctant to establish any definite time limits beyond which an arrestee could
not be held without presentation before a magistrate for determination of probable
cause, the court held that the plaintiff did assert the deprivation of a constitutional right
within the meaning of Gerstein and the fourth amendment. See id.; see also infra text accom-
panying notes 59-68 (discussion of Sanders v. City of Houston, 543 F. Supp. 694 (S.D. Tex.
1982)).
One line of Fifth Circuit cases has maintained that the Constitution imposes no direct
limitations on the permissible duration of postarrest, prehearing detention. See Anderson
v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183, 196 (5th Cir. 1971) (unreasonable or unnecessary delay in determin-
ing probable cause for arrest and detention will not support S 1983 cause of action), nwdified
en bane, 456 F.2d 835, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972); see also Rheaume v. Texas Dept.
of Public Safety, 666 F.2d 925, 929 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (dictum citing Anderson) (right
of immediate hearing before magistrate is not of constitutional dimension), cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 3484 (1982); Perry v. Jones, 506 F.2d 778, 781 (5th Cir. 1975) (failure immediately
to present arrestee before magistrate is not denial of due process). In Anderson, the court
refused to recognize any constitutional limitations on postarrest, prehearing detention ab-
sent further guidance from the Supreme Court. See 438 F.2d at 196, 172. Since Anderson,
however, Supreme Court language in Gerstein suggests that the Constitution imposes dura-
tional limitations on postarrest, prehearing detention. See Fisher v. Washington Area
Metropolitan Area Transit Auth., 690 F.2d 1133, 113940 (4th Cir. 1982) (citing Gerstein)
(fourth amendment reasonableness standard limits duration of postarrest detention prior
to probable cause determination); Sanders v. City of Houston, 543 F. Supp. 694, 699-701
(S.D. Tex. 1982) (citing Gerstein) (circumstances of each case determine constitutionality
of duration of postarrest, prehearing detention). Lively v. Cullinane, 451 F. Supp. 1000,
1005 (D.D.C. 1978) (citing Gerstein) (only strong showing that presentation delay is ad-
ministratively necessary will excuse delay under fourth amendment). Consistent with the
Fifth Circuit's previous reluctance to recognize limitations upon the duration of postarrest,
prehearing detention absent further guidance from the Supreme Court, the Sanders court
acknowledges that the Gerstein opinion mandates a constitutional prohibition against postar-
rest, prehearing detention of unreasonable duration. See infra text accompanying notes
59-68 (discussion of Sanders court analysis and holding that fourth amendment imposes limita-
tions on permissible duration of postarrest, prehearing detention).
" 543 F. Supp. 694 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
' See id. at 699-702.
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of Houston claiming that police department policy authorizing police to
detain arrestees on investigative hold"' before probable cause hearings
violates arrestees' fourth and fourteenth amendment rights 2 Since the
Gerstein court decided that the fourth amendment requires a judicial deter-
mination of probable cause prior to an extended restraint of liberty, the
Sanders court construed "extended" to determine the constitutionality
of the Houston investigative hold procedure.'
Relying on the Gerstein decision, the Sanders court explained that
a police officer's ad hoc assessment of probable cause for arrest permits
a brief period of detention to take administrative steps incident to arrest,
and that a magistrate must determine probable cause for arrest and postar-
rest detention before or promptly after arrest.' The Sanders court decided
that the failure of an arresting officer promptly to present an arrestee
for a probable cause hearing constitutes an extended restraint on the lib-
erty of the arrestee within the meaning of Gerstein unless the perfor-
mance of an administrative procedure incident to arrest excuses the delay.,
The Sanders court suggested that courts must balance state and individual
interests to determine whether police procedures prior to arrest are ad-
ministrative steps incident to arrest."' Relying on the traditional power
of federal courts to supervise the administration of criminal justice, the
Sanders court held that postarrest, prehearing detention is impermissi-
ble if an arresting officer fails to bring an arrestee before a magistrate
to determine probable cause within twenty-four hours of arrest.6 7 Although
postarrest, prehearing detention may be constitutional under the fourth
amendment analysis adopted by the Sanders court, the Sanders decision
" See id. at 697. Investigative hold refers to Houston investigatory arrest policy that
encourages police to "wrap up" loose ends of investigation after arrest but before probable
cause hearing. Id.
" See id. at 696-97. In Sanders, the court made detailed findings of fact based upon
police records and testimony. See id. The evidence exposed an unwritten rule in the Houston
Police Department permitting police to detain a suspect as long as seventy-two hours before
a judicial determination of probable cause for detention. See id. at 697.
See id. at 700-01.
See id. at 699-702 (citing Gerstein).
See id. at 700-01. In Sanders, the court explained that the Constitution dictates that
the interests of an arrestee once in custody are paramount and cannot be undercut by
arbitrary or protracted police procedures. See id. at 700-01; see also Lively v. Cullinane,
451 F. Supp. 1000, 1005 (D.D.C. 1978) (balancing weighs so heavy in favor of detained ar-
restee that police can justify delay before presentation only by showing delay was ad-
ministratively necessary).
' See 543 F. Supp. at 700-01 (determination of what constitutes extended detention
will vary with circumstances). In Sanders, the court explained that cases construing rule
5(a) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide guidance for determining what post-
arrest, prehearing procedures are administrative steps incident to arrest within the mean-
ing of Gerstein. See id. at 699; see supra note 56 (discussion of cases construing rule 5(a)
of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as guide for understanding Gerstein).
", See 543 F. Supp. at 701-703.
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also indicates that the Southern District of Texas will not tolerate postar-
rest, prehearing delay of more than twenty-four hours. 8
Although few other courts have considered whether there exist con-
stitutional limitations on permissible duration of postarrest detention prior
to a probable cause hearing, the Third Circuit has suggested that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, independent of the fourth
amendment, provides a basis for section 1983 actions. 9 In Patzig v. O'Neil,"
a Philadelphia police officer arrested Patzig for driving while intoxicated
at 4:30 a.m." The arresting officer took Patzig to a local police station.2
At 5:55 a.m., an officer transported Patzig to the Philadelphia Police Ad-
ministration Building for a breathalyzer test and a brief medical examina-
tion to determine Patzig's blood-alcohol level. 3 Although the tests proved
inconclusive, officers removed Patzig to a detention cell with two women
pending Patzig's arraignment before a magistrate. 7 At approximately 9:30
a.m., a police matron moved Patzig to a previously unoccupied cell where
the matron later found Patzig hanging dead by her belt.75 The decedent's
parents instituted a section 1983 action against numerous police super-
visors, officers, and matrons alleging that the delay in taking Patzig before
a magistrate violated Patzig's due process rights., At trial, the district
court granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the end
of the plaintiffs' case.
77
See id.
69 See infra text accompanying notes 70-80 (discussion of Third Circuit decision in Patzig
v. O'Neil, 577 F.2d 841 (3d Cir. 1978)). In Patzig v. O'Neil. the Third Circuit did not elaborate
on the nature of the fourteenth amendment prohibition against postarrest, prehearing deten-
tion of unreasonable duration. See 577 F.2d 841, 846-47 (3d Cir. 1978). Although the Patzig
court found no due process violation in the instant case, the court assumed that the due
process clause imposes limitations on permissible duration of postarrest, prehearing deten-
tion. See id. The unqualified assumption that the due process clause limits the duration
of postarrest, prehearing detention leaves the precise basis for the constitutional protec-
tion unidentified in the Third Circuit. See infra text accompanying note 86 (constitutional
limitation on duration of postarrest, prehearing detention may exist in fourth amendment,
made applicable to states through fourteenth amendment, or in fourteenth amendment due
process clause, independent of fourth amendment).
70 577 F.2d 841 (3d Cir. 1978).
" See id. at 845.
12 See id.
" See id.
" See id. Under Pennsylvania law, when an officer arrests a defendant without a war-
rant, an arresting officer shall present defendant before an issuing authority without un-
necessary delay for an immediate preliminary arraignment. See PA. R. GRIM. P. 130(a) (Pur-
don 1982). In Commonwealth v. Eaddy, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained that rule
130 assures an independent review of facts and circumstances alleged to provide probable
cause for arrest. 472 Pa. 409, 372 A.2d 759, 760 (1977).
11 See 577 F.2d at 845.
716 See id. at 845-46; see also 42 U.S.C. S 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (plaintiff must allege
deprivation of fourteenth amendment right by person acting under state law to state S
1983 cause of action).
" See 577 F.2d at 847. In Patzig, the district court granted defendants' motion for
[Vol. 40:1555
POSTARREST, PREHEARING DETENTION
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's order grant-
ing defendant's directed verdict against plaintiffs' claim that the officers'
failure to bring Patzig before a magistrate after five hours of detention
violated Patzig's due process rights under the fourteenth amendment."
The Patzig court held that a directed verdict for the defendants was ap-
propriate since confinement for five hours pending arraignment before
a magistrate does not, without more, constitute a deprivation of due pro-
cess rights.7 9 Although implicitly recognizing that the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause prohibits detentions of unreasonable duration,
the Patzig court refused to elaborate on what circumstances would sup-
port a section 1983 action for postarrest, prehearing detention of
unreasonable duration.'
Although the Constitution imposes direct limitations on permissible
duration of postarrest, prehearing detention, the question remains whether
the fourteenth amendment due process clause or the fourth amendment
reasonableness requirement provides the basis for the prohibition against
postarrest, prehearing custody of unreasonable duration. 1 In Patzig v.
O'Neil," the Third Circuit assumed that the fourteenth amendment due
process clause limits the duration of postarrest, prehearing detention. 3
The court, however, held that a five hour delay in bringing an arrestee
before a magistrate for a probable cause hearing did not violate the ar-
restee's fourteenth amendment due process rights.' Since the Patzig court
failed to elaborate on the nature of the constitutional protection, the Third
directed verdict pursuant to rule 50(a) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id.; see also
FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a) (order of court granting motion for directed verdict is effective without
assent of jury).
76 See 577 F.2d at 847. In Patzig, the Third Circuit held that the failure of enforcement
officers to bring Patzig before a magistrate prior to her suicide did not constitute unnecessary
delay. See id.; see also supra note 74 (discussion of rule 130(a) of Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal
Procedure requiring presentation of arrestee before magistrate without unnecessary delay).
See 577 F.2d at 846.
" See id. The Patzig court's implicit assumption that the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause imposes limits on the duration of postarrest, prehearing detention is consis-
tent with district courts that have addressed the issue. See Daly v. Pederson, 278 F. Supp.
88, 94-95 (D. Minn. 1967) (plaintiff failed to state S 1983 claim since arraignment of plaintiff
was reasonably prompt under fourteenth amendment due process); Sopp v. Gehrlein, 232
F. Supp. 881, 884 (W.D. Pa. 1964) (failure of arresting officer to bring plaintiff before magistrate
within six hours of arrest did not support § 1983 claim because six hour delay is not per
se violation of due process rights).
"1 See supra text accompanying notes 49-53 (discussion of fourth amendment analysis
in Fisher); notes 60, 63-65 (discussion of Sanders analysis); notes 78-80 (discussion of Patzig
court's assumption that due process limits duration of postarrest, prehearing detention).
577 F.2d 841 (3d Cir. 1978).
1 See Patzig v. O'Neil, 577 F.2d 841, 846-47 (3d Cir. 1978); see also supra text accom-
panying notes 78-80 (discussion of Patzig court's assumption that due process considera-
tions impose limitations on permissible duration of postarrest, prehearing detention).
See 577 F.2d at 846-47.
See id. (court assumed that due procxess clause limits duration of postarrest, prehear-
ing detention without finding violation of that right in case before bench).
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Circuit did not determine whether the constitutional prohibition against
extended postarrest, prehearing detention exists in the fourth amendment
reasonableness standard, made applicable to the states through the four-
teenth amendment, or in the fourteenth amendment due process clause,
independent of the fourth amendment. 8
A constitutional limitation on the duration of postarrest, prehearing
detention based solely on the fourteenth amendment due process clause
misinterprets Gerstein and departs from the majority view enunciated
in Fisher v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority' and Sanders
v. City of Houston." In Gerstein, the Supreme Court explained that the
fourth amendment traditionally defines the "process that is due" for
seizures of persons including the detention of arrestees pending trial.89
Since the Gerstein Court suggested that the reasonableness requirement
of the fourth amendment extends beyond arrest to govern postarrest
detention up until the required probable cause hearing, a fourteenth
amendment analysis for determining the constitutionality of postarrest,
prehearing detention is inappropriate.90 After a postarrest probable cause
determination, however, the conditions and the duration of pretrial
restraints on liberty fall under the fourteenth amendment due process
clause. 1
A fourteenth amendment due process analysis requires procedural
safeguards unnecessary to a detached and neutral determination of prob-
able cause.92 The Gerstein Court explained that a probable cause hearing
I See supra note 69 (unqualified assumption that due process clause limits duration
of postarrest, prehearing detention leaves precise basis for constitutional protection uniden-
tified in Third Circuit).
690 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir. 1982).
543 F. Supp. 694 (S.D. Tex. 1982); see infra text accompanying notes 89 & 90 (fourth
amendment, not fourteenth amendment, determines process that is due arrestee at prob-
able cause determination); notes 92-101 (fourteenth amendment due process safeguards do
not attach to probable cause hearing because fourth amendment is basis for constitutional
right to probable cause hearing prior to extended postarrest detention); see also supra text
accompanying notes 9, 20-25 (discussion of Gerstein analysis); 49-53 (discussion of Fisher
holding that fourth amendment prohibits postarrest, prehearing detention of unreasonable
duration); 60, 63-65 (discussion of Sanders holding that fourth amendment limits permissi-
ble duration of postarrest detention prior to probable-cause hearing). See generally supra
note 102 (list of courts that have recognized constitutional limitation on duration of post-
arrest, prehearing detention).
See 420 U.S. at 125 n.27.
o See 690 F.2d at 1140 n.10 (timeliness of probable cause determination by judicial
officer is matter of constitutional right under fourth amendment).
"' See id.; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979) (dicta) (due process clause
protects detainee from certain conditions and restrictions during pretrial detention).
See 420 U.S. at 119-20 (adversary safeguards including rights to counsel, confronta-
tion, and cross examination are not essential for probable cause determination required
by fourth amendment); see also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (due process
requires opportunity to be heard). See generally, Comment, Pretrial Detainees Have a Fourth
Amendment Right to a Nonadversary Judicial Determination of Probable Cause, 10 VAL. U.L.
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need not be adversarial because a probable cause hearing is not a critical
stage in the prosecution that requires the presence of counsel 3 The Ger-
stein Court suggested that the complex nature of criminal procedure and
the historical development of the probable cause requirement distinguish
recent Supreme Court decisions forbidding ex parte orders affecting in-
dividual property rights."
Although extending adversary safeguards to the probable cause hear-
ing may minimize the risk of probable cause determinations based on suspi-
cion or bias, an adversarial probable cause hearing would encroach on
the arrestee's rights against postarrest, prehearing detention of
unreasonable duration." Under a fourteenth amendment analysis, an im-
position of due process safeguards would provide an arrestee notice and
the opportunity to be heard.' An arrestee would have to retain counsel
and summon witnesses in order to establish a lack of probable cause for
further detention.17 A probable cause hearing requiring adversary
safeguards would make prompt postarrest determinations of probable
cause impossible. 8 Imposing due process guarantees on probable cause
hearings would cause longer periods of postarrest detention.9 As a prac-
tical matter, therefore, the prohibition against postarrest, prehearing
detention of unreasonable duration cannot fall within fourteenth amend-
ment due process requirements because due process requires procedural
safeguards that work against the prohibition against postarrest, prehear-
ing detention of unreasonable duration." The fourth amendment, however,
adequately assures an arrestee a prompt probable cause hearing because
the refusal of the Gerstein Court to extend adversary safeguards to prob-
REV. 199, 213 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Determination of Probable Cause] (due
process clause of fifth amendment may mandate extension of adversary safeguards to prob-
able cause determination).
I See supra note 21 (discussion of Gerstein holding that probable cause determination
does not require adversary safeguards and that probable cause determination is not critical
stage that requires appointment of counsel).
' See 420 U.S. at 125 n.27; see also North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di Chem, Inc.,
419 U.S. 601, 606-08 (1975) (fourteenth amendment requires adversary hearing to determine
probable cause before or shortly after deprivation of individuals property); Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp, 395 U.S. 337,430-42 (1969) (garnishment of wages by creditor without prior
right to be heard violates procedural due process). See generally Berdon, supra note 21,
at 31. (Judge Berdon objects to fact that protection of person's property requires more
process than protection of person's liberty before conviction after decision in Gerstein v. Pugh).
" See infra text accompanying notes 96-100 (extending adversary safeguards to pro-
bable cause hearing would increase duration of postarrest, prehearing detention because
detainees would spend longer periods in detention awaiting procurement of procedural
safeguards).
" See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
" See Judicial Determination of Probable Cause, supra note 92, at 214.
"' See id.
" See id. (longer periods of postarrest detention contribute to general pretrail delay).
10 See supra text accompanying notes 98 & 99 (procurement of procedural safeguards
extends duration of postarrest, prehearing detention).
15711983]
1572 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
able cause hearings avoids destructive competition between constitutional
rights."'
The Constitution imposes limitations on permissible duration of postar-
rest, prehearing detention.2 Relying on Gerstein v. Pugh,' the decisions
in Fisher v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority" and Sanders
v. City of Houston"' are the clearest and most recent decisions addressing
the issue of whether the Constitution limits the duration of postarrest
detention prior to the required probable cause hearing.' Basing the con-
stitutional prohibition against postarrest, prehearing detention on the
reasonableness standard of the fourth amendment, the courts have held
that an officer's ad hoc assessment of probable cause permits brief custodial
detention to allow enforcement officers to take administrative steps inci-
dent to arrest."' The courts' adoption of a fourth amendment analysis for
determining the constitutionality of postarrest, prehearing detention
strikes a necessary balance between the recognition of individual liberty
and the Supreme Court's reluctance to extend adversary safeguards to
probable cause hearings.0 8
If an arrestee can demonstrate that an individual acting under color
of state law violated his fourth amendment right against postarrest,
prehearing detention of unreasonable duration, the arrestee will prevail
IoI See id.
102 See Owen, supra note 13, at 24 (prompt presentation is fundamental right guaranteed
by Constitution); see also Fisher v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Auth., 690 F.2d
1133, 113940 (4th Cir. 1982) (fourth amendment limits duration of postarrest, prehearing
detention); Patzig v. O'Neil, 577 F.2d 841, 84647 (3d Cir. 1978) (due process limits duration
of postarrest, prehearing detention); McGill v. Parsons, 532 F.2d 484, 485-87 (5th Cir. 1976)
(dicta) (fourth amendment imposes limitations on postarrest detention prior to probable
cause hearing); Brown v. Fauntleroy, 442 F.2d 838, 839 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (citing Cooley v.
Stone, 414 F.2d 1213, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1969)) (per curiam) (fourth amendment prohibits penal
custody by state without prompt judicial determination of probable cause); Lively v. Cullinane,
451 F. Supp. 1000, 1005 (D.D.C. 1978) (only strong showing that presentation delay is ad-
ministratively necessary will excuse delay under fourth amendment); Dommer v. Hatcher,
427 F. Supp. 1040, 1045 (N.D. Ind. 1977) (holding arrestees for investigation more than 24
hours deprives arrestees of rights guaranteed by fourth amendment), modified, 653 F.2d
289 (1981).
100 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
104 690 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir. 1982).
105 543 F. Supp. 694 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
106 See supra notes 49-53 (discussion of Fisher analysis); notes 60, 63-65 (discussion of
Sanders analysis).
107 See Fisher v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Auth., 690 F.2d 1133, 1140 (4th
Cir. 1982) (case-by-case analysis determines validity of postarrest, prehearing delay); Sanders
v. City of Houston, 543 F. Supp. 694, 703, 705 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (police can delay probable
cause hearing only for time necessary to process arrestee).
10' Compare supra text accompanying notes 49-53 (discussion of Fisher holding that
fourth amendment imposes limitations on permissible duration of postarrest, prehearing
detention) and notes 60, 63-65 (discussion of Sanders holding that fourth amendment limits
duration of postarrest, prehearing detention) with supra note 21 (analysis of Gerstein Court's
refusal to extend adversary safeguards to probable cause determination).
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in a section 1983 action."9 Federal courts, however, have not awarded
monetary damages in section 1983 actions alleging deprivations of ar-
restees' right against postarrest, prehearing detention of unreasonable
duration."' The failure of federal courts to grant monetary damages in
such section 1983 actions reflects the limited opportunity federal courts
have had to address whether the Constitution imposes limitations on dura-
tion of postarrest, prehearing detention."' As practioners become aware
that the fourth amendment places limits on permissible duration of postar-
rest, prehearing detention, federal courts will hear an increased number
of section 1983 actions based on violations of that right.
JAMES FITZSIMMONS POWERS
109 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (plaintiff must allege deprivation of four-
teenth amendment right by person acting under color of state law to state 5 1983 cause
of action).
"10 See Fisher v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Auth., 690 F.2d 1133, 1141 (4th
Cir. 1982) (plaintiffs evidence failed to demonstrate deprivation of constitutional right against
postarrest, prehearing detention of unreasonable duration); Patzig v. O'Neil, 577 F.2d 841,
846-47 (3d Cir. 1978) (five hour detention, without more, does not violate due process). The
federal courts have issued injunctions against police arrest procedures deemed violative
of the constitutional prohibition against postarrest, prehearing detention of unreasonable
duration. See Sanders v. City of Houston, 543 F. Supp. 694, 705 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Lively
v. Cullinane, 451 F. Supp. 1000, 1005 (D.D.C. 1978); Dommer v. Hatcher, 427 F. Supp. 1040,
1043 (N.D. Ind. 1977), modified, 653 F.2d 289 (1981).
. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28 (courts only address issue of whether Con-
stitution imposes durational limitations on postarrest, prehearing detention in § 1983 ac-
tions that directly challenge duration of postarrest, prehearing custody).
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